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ABSTRACT
Client-side JavaScript has become ubiquitous in web applications
to improve user experience and reduce server load. However, since
clients are untrusted, servers cannot rely on the confidentiality or
integrity of client-side JavaScript code and the data that it operates
on. For example, client-side input validation must be repeated at
server side, and confidential business logic cannot be offloaded. In
this paper, we present TRUSTJS, a framework that enables trust-
worthy execution of security-sensitive JavaScript inside commodity
browsers. TRUSTJS leverages trusted hardware support provided
by Intel SGX to protect the client-side execution of JavaScript, en-
abling a flexible partitioning of web application code. We present
the design of TRUSTJS and provide initial evaluation results, show-
ing that trustworthy JavaScript offloading can further improve user
experience and conserve more server resources.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Web applications increasingly replace traditional desktop appli-
cations, mainly because developers gain instant deployability and
platform independence. With single-page applications [27], devel-
opers utilise client-side JavaScript code to provide a user experience
similar to desktop applications. This resulted in a substantial growth
of JavaScript, manifesting for example in JavaScript being the most
popular language on GitHub for several years [2] and Google en-
abling their crawlers to also handle JavaScript [18].
The success of JavaScript is founded in the ability to offload
computations to clients in a standardised, widely accepted fashion.
Offloading has two advantages: Firstly, it minimises round trip times,
resulting in a better user experience. Secondly, service providers
can save costs as less resources are demanded from servers.
However, despite all these benefits, offloading code to clients
has a strong limitation: From the provider’s view, clients can never
be assumed to be trustworthy. As a consequence, computation
results from clients may be wrong, corrupted, or incomplete. To
solve this, client results are typically checked for consistency at the
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server, which often requires recomputation [35]. An example for
this is input validation; server software repeats computations already
performed on client-side. Considering this on a global scale, this is
a massive waste of resources. Additionally, related projects [9, 1]
show that validation of input values on client and server side can be
error prone and introduce vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, the intellectual property (IP) of confidential Java-
Script code offloaded to the client cannot be protected. Compa-
nies may have decided against client-side computation because this
would require the disclosure of algorithms or business logic. For ex-
ample, banks might want to keep their scoring algorithms for credit
checks confidential. A contemporary approach to resolve this issue
is code obfuscation [14, 23], which is said to prevent theft, reverse
engineering or copyright infringements. However obfuscation has
been proven as insufficient [32, 13, 24].
These limitations, however, can be circumvented by exploiting
novel hardware extensions that enable trusted execution, such as
Intel SGX. The Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) consist
of a number of additional x86 instructions that allow the creation
of so-called enclaves. In these enclaves, hardware mechanisms
protect the execution of code from other potentially privileged code,
such as the operating system, the kernel and drivers. Moreover,
SGX prevents certain classes of hardware-based attacks by utilising
memory encryption and integrity checks.
SGX has recently been utilised for different client-side solutions
such as password stores [10, 25] and anti-cheat software [7]. Ad-
ditionally, it can enable secure execution of nearly or even totally
unmodified legacy applications [5, 34, 12, 8], help securing pub/sub
systems [31] and coordination services [11]. However, none of
these works addresses client-side web applications enabling trusted
execution of JavaScript code within commodity browsers.
In this paper we present the TRUSTJS web development frame-
work. It allows the development of web applications that execute
trusted and untrusted standard client-side JavaScript code side by
side. This is achieved, by adding a trusted JavaScript engine to a
browser and protect it with SGX. Being transparently integrated
into Firefox as an add-on, both installation and usage is easy for end
users. For developers, TRUSTJS provides techniques to simplify
the process of writing trusted JavaScript. Additionally, TRUSTJS
isolates the execution of JavaScript in browser tabs at runtime, dis-
tinguishing between untrusted and trusted parts. We present an
initial evaluation, which shows the benefits of TRUSTJS in terms of
latency and scalability, thus supporting our vision of a new way of
developing web applications.
2. BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we give details about Intel SGX, the core technol-
ogy behind TRUSTJS and introduce our assumed threat model.
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2.1 Intel SGX basics
In a nutshell, Intel SGX enables the protection of data and com-
putation in compartments called enclaves. Plaintext of enclave-
protected data is only available for computation inside the CPU
package and is guarded against unauthorised accesses by privileged
code or physical attackers. To achieve this, Intel SGX extends the
instruction set for recent x86 processors to enable the creation and
management of enclaves. Enclaves are associated with an isolated
logical memory range inside the address space of applications. SGX
protects the confidentiality and integrity of this range with check
sums and memory encryption. The logical addresses of the enclave
are mapped to pages, stored in a system-reserved memory range
called Enclave Page Cache (EPC).
Enclave development and interaction. Applications interact with
enclaves via ecalls and ocalls. These calls are defined by the devel-
oper on function granularity in the enclave description language.
Figure 1 shows the basic interaction pattern with enclaves: First,
the application creates the enclave from a binary. After that, ecalls
can be made into the enclave, and ocalls from the enclave; both
returning to the caller function after completion. Intel provides a
Software Development Kit (SDK) [22] for defining and handling
ecalls, ocalls and the enclave’s life cycle.
Enclave
Application
ecall
return return
ocall
enclave creation
trusted
execution
untrusted
execution
untrusted
execution
enclave destrucion
Figure 1: Basic interaction pattern between application and en-
clave with ecalls and ocalls.
Local and remote enclave attestation. A key concept of SGX is
attestation, which enables authentication of enclaves to a local or
remote party. It is based on SHA-256 digests called identities or
measurements and supported in two variants: MRENCLAVE, identi-
fying a specific version of an enclave, and MRSIGNER, identifying
the creator of the enclave. Moreover, an attestation is local if the
enclave is authenticated to another enclave on the same platform,
whereas remote attestation extends this local mechanism to allow a
remote party called the challenger the authentication of enclaves [4].
TRUSTJS heavily relies on this feature to create a trusted channel
between providers and enclaves on client machines, as described in
§4.2.
Both measurement variants are based on data structures called
reports containing both forms of enclave identities. While for lo-
cal attestation, reports are generated for and verified by arbitrary
enclaves, remote attestation relies on the Quoting Enclave (QE)
issued by Intel. The QE locally verifies reports and transforms them
into quotes, by adding a signature based on a key provisioned by
Intel. When the challenger receives the quote, she sends it to the
Intel-operated service called Intel Attestation Service (IAS), which
checks the signature and returns the result. On a positive result, the
challenger has successfully authenticated the remote enclave.
To perform a remote attestation, the challenger has to register for
the IAS once. He will be assigned a unique Service Provider ID
(SPID), which has to be transferred with every verification request.
Limitations of SGX. Despite all its benefits, the use of SGX im-
poses some limitations, that should be considered during system
design: first, applications running in enclaves have to be operating
system agnostic: by design, enclaves do not depend on mechanisms
usually provided by the operating system such as system calls and
memory management. Nevertheless, providing system calls in en-
claves is possible [5, 12, 34].
Second, the EPC is limited to 128 MB, a small fraction of mem-
ory that today’s applications consume. While page swapping is
supported, recent publications have shown a higher memory de-
mand results in a severe performance penalty [5, 11]. Thus, the
memory demand of enclaves should be kept low. This also means,
a system deploying enclaves at clients instead of servers has more
resources available since the EPC is limited per machine.
2.2 SGX-aware threat model
We define three roles that interact when TRUSTJS is in operation:
The enclave builder, the user and the service provider. The enclave
builder creates the enclave and ships it with the browser add-on,
which is installed by the user who owns and controls a client ma-
chine. Both the user and service provider trust the enclave and we
assume they can check its publicly available implementation. The
service provider offers a web-based service and uses TRUSTJS for
trusted execution at the user’s machine. He wants to protect the
integrity of the JavaScript code and, in case of IP protection, also
the confidentiality. The user trusts the service provider, in terms of
the offered service being benign. However, he does not trust the
(possibly encrypted) JavaScript code, but relies on the enclave for
isolated and secure execution. This implies, JavaScript being unable
to break out of the enclave.
For the design of TRUSTJS we act on a threat model typical
for SGX enclaves: an attacker has the client machine under full
control, including the operating system and the hardware—with the
exception of the CPU. However, we exclude denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks on enclaves from our threat model since the design of SGX
allows the host operating system (OS) to control enclave’s life cycles
anyway. That means, attackers can prevent or abort the execution of
enclaves, but should not gain any knowledge by doing so.
Furthermore, side-channel attacks [37, 36] based on vulnerabili-
ties of the application running inside the enclave are not of interest:
We assume all enclave software to be free of security-relevant bugs.
Finally, we assume the design and implementation of SGX itself,
including all cryptographic operations is secure and does not contain
any vulnerabilities.
3. DESIGN OF TRUSTJS
Running trusted and untrusted JavaScript side by side in a brow-
ser requires changes to its architecture. Keeping the threat model
described in § 2.2 in mind, we place an additional JavaScript inter-
preter inside an enclave and integrate it as a browser add-on. We
rely on Intel SGX due to its availability on current commodity x86
processors, which will most likely be supported by a major fraction
of future client machines. We refer to the SGX-protected JavaScript
engine as interpreter enclave.
The high-level architecture of TRUSTJS is shown in Figure 2:
A browser with the TRUSTJS add-on installed, having multiple
instances of the interpreter enclave (IE), each one associated with a
service provider (SP). TRUSTJS creates a trusted channel between
the service provider and its assigned enclave, enabling them to
communicate integrity and confidentiality protected.
The interpreter enclave should be viewed as a trusted two-way
sandbox like Ryoan [21]: as in normal browsers, users trust the
interpreter, in terms of JavaScript code not being able to break out
of it. In addition, service providers assume that enclaves do not
accept other JavaScript which could leak secrets. Service providers
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-201903191457-0
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Figure 2: High Level Architecture of TrustJS; example with three
service providers (SP), each associated with an client-side inter-
preter enclave (IE) running inside the browser.
can load arbitrary JavaScript code into interpreter enclaves, as long
as the boundary between trusted and untrusted parts is on function
granularity. We refer to JavaScript functions loaded into the enclave
as trusted functions.
The add-on manages life cycles for multiple interpreter enclave
instances: when the user opens a new tab, an enclave is assigned
to it; when it is closed the enclave is destroyed. TRUSTJS uses an
enclave pool containing more enclaves than open tabs. Enclaves
are continuously created in the background, as the user opens new
tabs. Thus, enclave initialisation times do not affect user experience.
TRUSTJS ensures that internal states of the interpreter enclave can
never be leaked to other providers, neither by reusing enclave in-
stances nor by loading potentially malicious code by other parties.
This is achieved by assigning new enclaves, if a provider change is
detected within a tab. Also, the interpreter enclave is designed to
load code signed by one single provider only.
For loading JavaScript functions into the enclave, service provi-
ders can choose between authenticated and confidential code, by
either signing or additionally encrypting parts of the HTML files
they deliver (see §5). As dynamically generated JavaScript cannot
by authenticated, TRUSTJS does not support the commonly mis-
used eval() function. Also, since encrypted JavaScript cannot
be inspected, TRUSTJS offers policies, allowing users to decide for
every website whether confidential JavaScript is enabled. This will
influence the functionality of websites, but empowers users to pre-
vent untrusted providers from executing confidential code on their
machines. In addition, TRUSTJS guarantees the integrity and/or
confidentiality of return values. Instead of returning plain values,
JSON objects are returned. These contain the original return value,
either in plaintext or encrypted as well as a Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) over the data.
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRUSTJS
This section gives details about the implementation of TRUSTJS
on a lower level. This comprises the client-side components (§4.1)
and the remote attestation of interpreter enclaves (§4.2).
4.1 TrustJS client-side components
TRUSTJS consists of three components, as depicted in Figure 3:
the TRUSTJS add-on installed in a browser, an untrusted enclave
bridge and the interpreter enclave. All components are running in
the browser process context, thus circumventing expensive IPC calls
and being the easiest approach with Intel SGX. The components are
interconnected with different mechanisms, either provided by the
Mozilla Add-on SDK [28] or the Intel SGX SDK [22]: the browser
and the add-on use port objects to communicate via asynchronous
messages. Since the add-on and bridge are written in different
languages we use js-ctypes [29] to create an appropriate interface
between JavaScript and native C code. The bridge uses ecalls to
enter the enclave and handles ocalls originating from it. In the
HTML page
Browser process
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injected
content script ports
ecalls
ocalls
JS Engine
JS Engine
Add-on Bridge
trusted
JavaScript
execution
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Figure 3: The components of TrustJS at client-side, showing un-
trusted components in red and trusted components in green.
following paragraphs, we describe all components in more detail
and provide an overview of their tasks.
TRUSTJS browser add-on. The add-on is responsible for con-
necting the rest of TRUSTJS’s components with the browser and
initiating the transfer of trusted functions into the enclave. This
is achieved by injecting a content script into pages loaded by the
browser. The script finds all HTML script tags with trustjs
attributes (see § 5) in the current document. As these contain signed
or encrypted JavaScript code, they are transferred into the enclave
for signature checks and/or decryption and later execution. Fur-
thermore, the original trusted scripts are replaced with proxies that
delegate calls to the implementations now residing in the enclave.
This includes the handling of function parameters and return values.
Untrusted enclave bridge. The untrusted enclave bridge is a binary
shipped with the add-on, implementing functions called by the
extension. It is completely stateless, simply translating calls from
the extension into ecalls as well as forwarding ocalls. In essence,
the bridge exposes the interface of the enclave to the browser. Note,
that the bridge cannot be omitted by letting the add-on call enclave
functions directly, as the bridge needs to invoke SGX instructions
necessary to start, enter and destruct the interpreter enclaves.
Interpreter enclave. The implementation of the interpreter enclave
is also shipped with the add-on. Its purpose is the trusted execution
of JavaScript. Our prototype is based on MuJS [6], a lightweight
JavaScript interpreter that is fully compatible to version ES5 of the
ECMA-262 standard [17]. Compared to more sophisticated inter-
preters like V8 [19] or SpiderMonkey [30], MuJS has a relatively
small codebase of less than 14 KLOC and does not support just-
in-time compilation. Both properties ease the process of porting it
into the enclave and lead to a small trusted computing base, which
improves security.
4.2 Remote attestation and key exchange
Service providers need a public key from and a shared secret with
an assigned interpreter enclave for two crucial tasks: The signing
and/or encryption of trusted functions and the verification/decryp-
tion of return values. In order to trust results, service providers need
to ensure the aforementioned public key has been generated in an
interpreter enclave they trust. Assuming the code of the interpreter
enclave has been released as open source, service providers can
check the implementation and maintain a list of hashes of trust-
worthy enclaves. By using compilation instructions by the enclave
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builder for reproducible and verifiable builds [15], these hashes can
be compared with the enclave measurement MRENCLAVE.
To establish trust between a service provider and an interpreter
enclave, a remote attestation is performed. Depending on the use
case, this happens before verifying return values or deploying con-
fidential code. As described in § 2.1, the attestation is based on
reports and quotes. By design, both report and quote can contain
512 bits of arbitrary data, which is included in all cryptographic
operations performed on these data structures. We use this field to
embed a hash of an ephemeral public key created during enclave
start. By doing so, service providers can receive a public key from
interpreter enclaves and a proof, that it has been generated by an
enclave they trust.
The process for remote attestation and key exchange works as
follows: the service provider embeds his SPID (obtained from Intel,
see §2.1) and a target URL for the final quote into his document.
TRUSTJS persistently caches SPIDs and URLs associated with
providers to speed up setup time for future requests. When the user
opens the browser (or a new tab), the add-on assigns an existing
interpreter enclave, which has already generated an ephemeral key
pair. As the user visits the providers website, the SPID is obtained
from either the document or the cache. Subsequently, the add-on
issues an ecall, creating a report, containing a hash of the generated
public key. Upon return, the ecall discloses two data structures: the
aforementioned report and the public key itself. Via another ecall to
the QE, a quote based on the report and SPID is created. Note, that
the quote also contains the hash of the public key and is verifiable
by Intel. Subsequently, the TRUSTJS add-on sends both the quote
and the public key to the URL defined by the service provider.
Every service provider operates a web service, which receives
both the quote and public key. After the quote has been sent to the
IAS and a response has arrived, the provider verifies three properties:
(i) the IAS response is positive (ii) the public key matches the hash
embedded in the quote (iii) the MRENCLAVE value in the quote
matches a known hash. If these are fulfilled, the provider is certain
a trustworthy environment has been created, the public key was
generated in it and the corresponding private key has never left it.
He generates a secret key, encrypts it with the public key and sends
it back to the client.
After completion, the client uses the shared secret to add HMACs
to or perform encryption on results of the trusted JavaScript func-
tions. In contrast, the service provider uses the verified public key to
encrypt or sign JavaScript code. In order to avoid additional message
overhead, this message exchange is embedded in HTTP requests
and responses that need to happen anyway for web applications to
work (see Figure 4).
5. APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT
With the TRUSTJS framework, new possibilities are introduced
to web developers as clients can execute JavaScript in a trusted
way. Hence, a new programming paradigm is necessary. Developers
should view client-side JavaScript as a central and trusted part of
their infrastructure providing reliable computing resources. To allow
this, developers need to perform additional steps: meta information
has to be provided, trusted scripts have to be annotated and signed
or encrypted. This section gives an overview about these steps and
shows how TRUSTJS implements them.
For the remote attestation of the interpreter enclave (see §4.2)
to work, developers have to provide additional information: first,
clients need to know the SPID and a quote target URL for remote
attestation (see § 2.1). These have to be embedded by developers as
shown in Listing 1. When a page is loaded, the TRUSTJS add-on
extracts this information.
<meta name="trustjs:spid" content="BF..40"/>
<meta name="trustjs:url"
content="https://host/quote"/>
Listing 1: Meta information embedded by service providers for
remote attestation.
<script trustjs-encrypt="yes">
/* @exposed confidentialFunction 1 */
function hiddenFunction(y) { ...
}
function confidentialFunction(x) { ...
hiddenFunction(x);
}
</script>
<script>var a = confidentialFunction(42);</script>
Listing 2: Trusted JavaScript code before encryption.
Second, developers have to annotate JavaScript code for trusted
execution. TRUSTJS implements this by evaluating additional at-
tributes of script tags: trustjs-auth for integrity-protected
and trustjs-encrypt for confidential code. The following
listings illustrate this by an example for two confidential functions.
Listing 2 shows two HTML script tags before encryption: while
the first one will be executed inside the interpreter enclave, the sec-
ond one will be executed by the browsers default engine and call
the trusted function. The @exposed annotation is essential and
used by the interpreter enclave for making only developer-defined
exposed functions callable: Here, hiddenFunction is not ac-
cessible from untrusted JavaScript. The number in the annotation
denotes the number of arguments the function takes.
After encryption, the content looks like shown in Listing 3: The
content of the annotated tag is encrypted and embedded as a base64-
encoded string, while the calling, untrusted function is untouched.
In fact, it will call a proxy function generated by TRUSTJS which
matches name and arguments of the original function. Note, that a
proxy is only generated for exposed functions and the interpreter
enclave prevents calling other functions than these. Additionally,
we implemented an HTML generator, which can be used by service
providers to generate partly encrypted HTML documents based on
these annotations.
<script trustjs-encrypt="yes"
trustjs-blob="X6YXkazAVA7oBZYC..9CkX0Tq9I="/>
<script>var a = confidentialFunction(42);</script>
Listing 3: Trusted JavaScript after encryption with encrypted
base64-encoded script.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate the benefits that both user and
service provider gain from using TRUSTJS, when developers can
adapt their approach to save resources. To evaluate the impact of this
adoption, we create a setup involving three network entities (client,
server and IAS) and explore latency between client and server as
well as the scalability of the server software. For the client, we use a
typical client machine: a laptop with an i7-6500U CPU. The server
is implemented in Node.js and runs on a t2.medium Amazon EC2 [3]
instance (2 vCPUs, 4 GB RAM), deployed in the us-east-1a region.
The IAS is a web service operated by Intel. The average ping round
trip time between client and server is 99 ms, between server and
IAS 25 ms.
We create a simple web application, that repeatedly performs n
calculations c1, . . . ,cn on client-side. To show the positive impact
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of TRUSTJS, we require the results to be checked before giving the
client a new task (i.e. ci−1 has to be verified before ci is performed).
This requirement allows the TRUSTJS application to do calculations
locally and send the combined results to the server. We impose this
additional requirement to show that TRUSTJS enables developers to
re-think their architectures. In a real world application, this can for
example be a multi-step form whose input has to be verified before
giving new information to users.
As a place holder for general computations, we use an empty
JavaScript loop with 5000 iterations. When not using TRUSTJS, this
loop is executed in the default engine of the browser. On contrary,
when using TRUSTJS, the loop is executed within the interpreter
enclave. In the following, we explore the latency and scalability
of applications using TRUSTJS and compare these properties to
traditional web applications not relying on TRUSTJS. We do not
indicate errors because of negligibility.
Latency. Web applications easily suffer from high latencies, as it is
a crucial value, potentially having detrimental effects on user expe-
rience. A traditional implementation without TRUSTJS increasingly
builds up latency, as can be inferred from Figure 4a. In contrast, as
Figure 4b shows, using TRUSTJS can save round trips: The client is
trustworthy, thus, multiple server side recalculations can be replaced
with one single HMAC verification. Both figures show three points
Client
calc2
Server
HTTP GET
calc1
calc1
HTML
t1
t2
t0
HTTP POST
Result
HTTP POST
Result
calc2
(a) Traditional web application with server-side re-calculations.
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(b) Web application using TrustJS with single server-side HMAC check,
SPID and POST URL are assumed to be cached.
Figure 4: Latency build-up of web applications with and without
TrustJS, number of calculations n = 2.
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Figure 5: Comparison of latency and scalability properties of web
applications with and without TrustJS.
in time t0, t1 and t2 that represent three intervals:
I1 = [t0, t1] I2 = [t1, t2] I3 = [t0, t2] = I1 + I2
I1 is the page load time perceived by the user, which is larger for
TRUSTJS applications, as it includes a round trip for remote attesta-
tion. In contrast, the application run time I2 depends on the number
of calculations performed and thus grows faster for applications
not using TRUSTJS. The number of calculations n of our sample
application is pivotal for the total application runtime I3.
With TRUSTJS the average value of I1 is 343 ms, without it is
109 ms. Figure 5a details the total runtime in dependency of the
number of calculations n for both implementations. It shows that
our sample application using TRUSTJS experiences shorter latencies
compared to a traditional implementation when n > 3.
Scalability. In web applications with many users, servers can easily
become the bottle neck. We explore the scalability of web servers
by observing the CPU utilisation when increasing the number of
clients. Figure 5b shows the single core server load for a growing
number of simulated clients. It shows, that executing most of the
application logic on clients only with TRUSTJS can reduce the server
load significantly: Without TRUSTJS, the server reaches full CPU
utilisation when serving 250 clients. When relying on TRUSTJS,
however, this point is reached at 700 clients.
7. RELATEDWORK
Although it was initially assumed that only small tailored applica-
tions would be executed inside enclaves [20] such as [10, 25, 7], a
recent trend is to consider enclaves as a generic isolation environ-
ment for arbitrary applications: VC3 [33] uses enclaves to secure
MapReduce jobs; Haven [8] places a library OS inside an enclave
for running unmodified Windows applications, Graphene [12] fol-
lows a similar approach for legacy Linux applications. SCONE [5]
and PANOPLY [34] also enable Linux applications in enclaves, but
minimise the TCB by delegating system calls to the host OS.
MiniBox [26] is a general hypervisor-based sandbox for PaaS
platforms. Ryoan [21] is an SGX-based distributed sandbox for
untrusted platforms such as machine learning services. Both ap-
proaches solve a similar problem as TRUSTJS with two-way sand-
boxing that can run on untrusted systems and can execute code
defined by other parties.
Ripley [35] addresses the problem of untrusted clients by auto-
matically replicating the execution of client JavaScript on servers.
Although this approach can detect malicious clients, computational
resources cannot be saved at server-side. CRYPTON [16] intro-
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duces a trusted kernel on client-side providing memory encryption
and trusted I/O, but has no capabilities of trusted execution. Auto-
FBI [39] spawns new browser instances for security relevant web-
sites, which is to some extend a similar approach to our multiple
interpreter enclaves. In contrast to TRUSTJS, these solutions do not
rely on trusted execution mechanisms as for example provided by
SGX and thus can only provide inferior security.
Finally, there are systems that could benefit from TRUSTJS’s
contributions. Maygh [38] for example is a JavaScript-based content
delivery network built on top of untrusted clients. Trust issues are
solved by comparing hashes for files being distributed. The trusted
execution of JavaScript could help this approach.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have presented TRUSTJS, a novel framework that enables
trustworthy execution of client-side JavaScript code inside com-
modity browsers. TRUSTJS allows service providers to save re-
sources and developers to create better user experiences. We showed
that with TRUSTJS, developers can offload computation, resulting
in users experiencing lower latencies when they interact frequent
enough and servers being able to handle more clients. Still, the
extent of saved resources is depended of the use case.
In order to achieve better performance by just-in-time compilation
and provide stronger isolation, we plan to use a more sophisticated
JavaScript engine for the interpreter enclave, for example V8 [19].
Also, we want to provide richer functionality inside the enclave by
supporting parts of the NodeJS API.
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